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DISPOSSESSING RESIDENT VOICE: MUNICIPAL 
RECEIVERSHIPS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST
Juliet M. Moringiello*
ABSTRACT
The residents of struggling cities suffer property dispossessions both as individual owners 
and as municipal residents. Their individual dispossessions are part of a cycle that often 
begins with industrial decline. In Detroit, for example, more than 100,000 residents have 
lost their homes to tax foreclosure over a four-year period that bracketed the city’s bankruptcy 
filing. Falling property values, job losses, and foreclosures affect municipal budgets by reduc-
ing tax revenues.  As individual dispossessions exacerbate municipal financial crises, resi-
dents can also face the loss of municipal property. Struggling cities and towns often sell pub-
licly owned property—from parks to parking systems—to balance municipal budgets. 
This article discusses the relationship between property dispossessions and proceedings to 
resolve municipal financial distress, with a focus on another important loss faced by resi-
dents of distressed municipalities—the loss of their voice in municipal government. A munic-
ipal financial crisis, by itself, has no effect on the property of any individuals who live in the 
city, and a city’s bankruptcy does not take a city’s assets in the same way that a corporate or 
personal bankruptcy can take the property of a business or individual. Yet even though credi-
tors cannot force the sale of city-owned assets, the decision to transfer the property may be 
made by unelected officials appointed by the state government to replace city government in 
times of financial crisis. This results in another type of collective dispossession—the dispos-
session of resident voice in local government affairs. This article discusses how insolvency 
proceedings, including Chapter 9 bankruptcy, can deprive residents of their voice and, in 
turn, deprive them of the city’s assets that the city holds for them in public trust and proposes 
some suggestions for states for balancing the need for resident voice with higher-level finan-
cial oversight as they determine how to manage the financial distress of their cities. 
* Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, Widener University Com-
monwealth Law School. Many thanks to the editors and staff of the Michigan Journal of Law 
Reform for hosting the thought-provoking symposium, Dispossessing Detroit, for which this Ar-
ticle was written.
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The residents of struggling cities suffer property dispossessions 
both as individual owners and as interested community members. 
Their individual dispossessions are part of a cycle that often begins 
with industrial decline.1 In Detroit, for example, more than 
100,000 residents have lost their homes to tax foreclosure over a 
four-year period that bracketed the city’s bankruptcy filing.2 Falling 
property values, job losses, and foreclosures affect municipal budg-
ets by reducing tax revenues.3 As individual dispossessions exacer-
bate municipal financial crises, residents can also face the loss of 
municipal property. Struggling cities and towns often sell publicly 
owned property—from parks to parking systems—to balance mu-
nicipal budgets.4
1. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1133–39 
(2014) (describing the effects of deindustrialization on the population of the affected cit-
ies).
2. See Bernadette Atuahene & Timothy R. Hodge, Stategraft, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 263,
266–69 (2018) (explaining the tax foreclosures in Detroit between 2011 and 2015, and 
comparing demographic information of Detroit residents, such as income levels and unem-
ployment rates, to national averages).
3. See John C. Philo, Governance: Local Government Fiscal Emergencies and the Disenfran-
chisement of Victims of the Global Recession, 13 J.L. SOC’Y 71, 72–80 (2011) (drawing connections 
between the global recession and government financial crises in Michigan and Rhode Is-
land). See also Anderson, supra note 1.
4. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 1121–22 (explaining how financially struggling cities 
“shed their property – public assets like parks, pools, and government office buildings”).
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This Article discusses the relationship between property dispos-
sessions and proceedings to resolve municipal financial distress, 
with a focus on another important loss faced by residents of dis-
tressed municipalities—the loss of their voice in municipal gov-
ernment. The conditions that lead to individual dispossessions, 
such as foreclosures, occur independently of any proceeding to re-
solve municipal financial distress, but likely foreshadow such a 
proceeding.5 These proceedings can be purely state-managed pro-
ceedings such as those under Pennsylvania’s Municipalities Finan-
cial Recovery Act, also known as Act 47, or purely federally man-
aged, such as proceedings under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy 
Code. Sometimes, as was the case in Detroit’s bankruptcy, the 
manager appointed pursuant to the state process directs the Chap-
ter 9 process.6 The proceeding to resolve the municipality’s financ-
es can in turn lead to dispossession of publicly owned property or 
collective dispossession.
A municipal financial crisis, by itself, has no effect on the prop-
erty of any individuals who live in the city, and a city’s bankruptcy 
does not take a city’s assets in the same way that a corporate or per-
sonal bankruptcy can take the property of a business or individual.7
Yet even though creditors cannot force the sale of city-owned as-
sets, unelected officials appointed by the state government to re-
place city government officials in times of crisis may make the deci-
sion to transfer property. This results in another type of collective 
dispossession—the dispossession of resident voice in local govern-
ment affairs.
In this article, I will discuss how insolvency proceedings, includ-
ing Chapter 9 bankruptcy, can deprive residents of their voice and 
in turn deprive them of the city’s assets that the city holds for them 
in public trust. I will first discuss municipal bankruptcy law under 
Chapter 9 to explain how, although it is silent on city governance, 
it permits states to impose financial oversight on their cities. After 
doing so, I will discuss models of state oversight. After discussing 
state oversight, I will discuss the status of municipal property and 
the reality that struggling municipalities sell or otherwise monetize 
property to balance their budgets. I will conclude by proposing 
some suggestions for states to preserve resident voice while main-
taining higher-level financial oversight as they determine how to 
manage the financial distress of their cities. These suggestions re-
5. See Philo, supra note 3, at 81–91 (explaining the legislative efforts to address munic-
ipal financial crises in Michigan and Rhode Island).
6. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1558(1) (West 2020).
7. Creditors of municipalities have no right to force a sale of a municipality’s assets. See 
infra notes 102–106 and accompanying text.
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late to both state law and the Bankruptcy Code; as I have discussed 
elsewhere, Chapter 9 bankruptcy was designed to work with, not as 
an alternative to, state financial intervention processes.8
I. MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE
A. The Skeletal Nature of Chapter 9
Municipal bankruptcy became part of federal law in the 1930s in 
the wake of a wave of defaults on municipal debt. Thousands of 
municipalities had defaulted on their debt obligations during the 
Great Depression, and because by the 1930s municipal debt was 
held by investors throughout the country, municipal finance ex-
perts believed that a federal process to resolve municipal financial 
debt was necessary.9 The enactment of the predecessor to today’s
Chapter 9 was not easy and took two trips to the U.S. Supreme 
Court to confirm that Congress had the power to enact a process 
to resolve municipal financial distress.10 Such a power had been 
thrown into doubt by the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, 
under which the powers “not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.”11
A state has the first and last word on municipal powers. One 
long-standing theory of local government is Dillon’s Rule, which 
posits that municipalities are creatures of their states and therefore 
have only the powers granted to them by their states.12 Yet federal 
8. See generally Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 403 (2014); see also Laura Napoli Coordes & Thom Reilly, Predictors of 
Municipal Bankruptcies and State Intervention Programs: An Exploratory Study, 105 KY. L.J. 493, 
498 (2016) (illustrating that “Chapter 9 bankruptcy and state relief can work together and 
need not be viewed as mutually exclusive or working at cross-purposes”) (emphasis in origi-
nal).
9. See Moringiello, supra note 8, at 440–42 (describing the conditions that led to the 
enactment of the first municipal bankruptcy law).
10. Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936) (hold-
ing that the first federal bankruptcy statute was unconstitutional as a violation of state sover-
eignty); United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 52–54 (1938) (holding that a slightly modified 
statute was consistent with both the Fifth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution be-
cause by authorizing a political subdivision to file for bankruptcy the state acts “in aid, and 
not in derogation of, its sovereign powers”); see also Andrew B. Dawson, Beyond the Great Di-
vide: Federalism Concerns in Municipal Insolvency, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 40–44 (2017) 
(explaining the sovereignty concerns about the first federal municipal bankruptcy statutes).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
12. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907) (“Municipal corporations 
are political subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of 
the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them. . . . The state . . . at its 
pleasure may modify or withdraw all such powers . . . . without the consent of the citizens, or 
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courts opining on the relationship between municipalities and 
their states have sometimes treated local governments as exten-
sions of their residents, recognizing the autonomy that local gov-
ernments have in practice.13 The constitutional status of states and 
cities drove the original structure of the municipal bankruptcy law, 
and that structure defines today’s Chapter 9.14 The rules in Chap-
ter 9 recognize the state’s relationship with the federal govern-
ment, as well as the relationship between the municipality and its 
state, but Chapter 9 is silent with respect to the relationship be-
tween state government and the residents of those municipalities.
As the municipal bankruptcy law evolved, it increasingly drew 
from Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, the chapter used by 
business entities to reorganize.15 Although Chapter 9 is based on 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, it is silent with respect to two 
types of governance controls that are an important part of Chapter 
11. The first relates to management of the debtor entity. Chapter 
11 gives a debtor’s creditors and the bankruptcy judge control over 
how the debtor manages the bankruptcy case.16 In a Chapter 11
proceeding, the management of a debtor entity becomes the 
“debtor in possession,” with fiduciary duties towards the debtor’s
creditors.17 If the debtor in possession mismanages the bankruptcy 
case, the court has the power to appoint an examiner or a trustee.18
even against their protest.”); see also Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of Ameri-
can Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83, 88–89.
13. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 74 (8th ed. 2016) (explaining that this approach is important in 
cases involving voting rights in local elections).
14. See Moringiello, supra note 8, at 446–61 (describing the history of municipal bank-
ruptcy legislation).
15. See generally Joseph Patchan & Susan B. Collins, The 1976 Municipal Bankruptcy Law,
31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 287 (1977) (explaining that Congress amended the predecessor to 
Chapter 9 in 1976 to accommodate the possibility that larger cities might file for bankrupt-
cy).
16. Commentators have observed that Chapter 9 gives the court few powers over the 
city. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal 
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 291 (2012) (noting that Chapter 9 appears to preclude a 
court’s ability to impose resource adjustments on a municipality); Michael W. McConnell & 
Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U.
CHI. L. REV. 425, 472 (1993) (arguing that “municipal bankruptcy law strictly limits the pow-
ers—hence the utility—of the bankruptcy court”). But see Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form 
and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 55, 59 (2016) (using an in-depth 
study of the court proceedings in Detroit’s bankruptcy case to challenge the conventional 
account of judicial minimalism in Chapter 9).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2018) (defining “debtor in possession” as the debtor); Id.
§ 1107(a) (2018) (imposing upon a debtor in possession all of the duties of a bankruptcy 
trustee); Id. § 704 (2018) (setting forth the duties of the bankruptcy trustee); see generally 
Steven Rhodes, The Fiduciary and Institutional Obligations of a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee, 80
AM. BANKR. L.J. 147 (2006); Martin J. Bienenstock, Conflicts Between Management and the Debtor 
in Possession’s Fiduciary Duties, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 543 (1992).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2018).
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These powers are missing from Chapter 9.19 In the absence of 
bankruptcy controls, questions of managing the debtor municipali-
ty are questions of state law.
The second governance control relates to the debtor’s assets. 
Chapter 11 gives a debtor’s creditors and the court a governance 
role with respect to the debtor’s property. In all types of bankrupt-
cy other than Chapter 9, an estate is created at the moment of the 
bankruptcy filing, and that estate contains all interests in property 
that the debtor had at the time of the filing.20 The estate forms the 
foundation of the bankruptcy case, and the court and creditors de-
cide what happens to the estate property. For example, Chapter 11 
requires that the court approve sales of property of the estate,21
and the value of the estate property provides the baseline for credi-
tor distributions in Chapter 11.22 Creditors may request that the 
court convert the Chapter 11 case to a Chapter 7 case, thus forcing 
liquidation of the estate property.23 The court and the creditors 
have none of those powers in a Chapter 9 case because there is no 
bankruptcy estate in a Chapter 9 case.24 In addition, Chapter 9 ex-
plicitly denies to the court the power to interfere with the debtor’s
use of its property or revenues.25
B. Chapter 9 as a Last Resort
Unlike Chapter 11, Chapter 9 contains strict eligibility require-
ments. One is that the state specifically authorize a municipal 
bankruptcy filing.26 Another is that the municipality be insolvent.27
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2018) (listing the sections of other chapters of the Bank-
ruptcy Code that apply in Chapter 9 cases). Chapter 11 also provides for the appointment of 
a creditors’ committee as an additional level of oversight over the debtor in possession. 11 
U.S.C. §§ 1102–03 (2018). There is a split among courts as to whether a creditors’ commit-
tee can be appointed in a Chapter 9 case. Although § 901 makes § 1102, the section that 
directs the United States Trustee to appoint a creditors’ committee, applicable in Chapter 9, 
§ 1102 directs the U.S. Trustee to do so “as soon as practicable after an order for relief un-
der chapter 11” (emphasis added). See In re City of Detroit, 519 B.R. 673, 678–79 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 2014) (holding § 1102(a)(1) inapplicable in Chapter 9 as a matter of statutory inter-
pretation); In re County of Orange, 219 B.R. 543, 558 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997) (recognizing 
that the U.S. Trustee had appointed the creditors’ committee under § 1102(a)(1)).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2018).
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2018) (allowing the trustee to use, sell, or lease property of the 
estate after notice and a hearing and allowing the court to condition such use, sale, or 
lease).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2018) (using the liquidation value of the estate as the base-
line for creditor distributions).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2018).
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2018) (omitting §§ 363 and 541 from the list of Bankruptcy 
Code sections that apply in Chapter 9).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 904(2) (2018).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2018).
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Insolvency in the municipal context is defined differently from in-
solvency in the business or individual context. A business or hu-
man debtor is insolvent when the debtor’s debts exceed the debt-
or’s assets.28 Recognizing that a municipality has no assets that are 
available to creditors through a forced sale, the Bankruptcy Code 
states that a debtor is insolvent for Chapter 9 purposes when it is 
generally not paying its debts as they become due or is unable to 
pay its debts as they become due.29 Because a municipality has tax-
ing powers, it has not always been clear what insolvency means, de-
spite the definition.30 The insolvency requirement reinforces the 
idea that municipal bankruptcy is a last resort that should be used 
only when the federal bankruptcy power is necessary to resolve the 
municipality’s financial distress.31
The litigation over Bridgeport, Connecticut’s eligibility for 
Chapter 9 in 1991 illustrates how detrimental the insolvency re-
quirement can be to city residents. When Bridgeport filed for 
bankruptcy, the city budget cuts had been so severe that the city 
employed ninety fewer police officers than it needed to provide 
“basic, adequate services,” and the police department’s detective 
staff was half as large as it should have been.32 Its public works de-
partment was similarly stretched; the cuts in residential garbage 
collection had created a rodent and arson hazard, and the public 
works director testified that snow removal in the coming winter 
would be minimal.33 Although the city had argued in its eligibility 
hearing that it was unable either to cut services further or raise the 
taxes to pay for them, the court found that Bridgeport was not in-
solvent and thus ineligible for bankruptcy.34 According to the 
court, because Bridgeport could not prove that it could not pay its 
debts as they became due either in its current fiscal year or its next 
fiscal year, it was not insolvent for bankruptcy purposes.35
In the years since Bridgeport was denied bankruptcy protection,
courts have applied a service delivery insolvency analysis to the in-
solvency calculation. The term first appeared in the eligibility opin-
27. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3) (2018).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(A)–(B) (2018).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (2018). This definition has caused some headaches for 
courts. Recently judges have developed the concept of “service delivery insolvency.”
30. See Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial Rule in 
Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150, 1182–83 (2016) (explaining that it can be difficult 
for a municipality to meet the insolvency requirement because they have access to tax reve-
nues).
31. In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 788 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2013).
32. See In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B. R. 332, 335 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (setting forth 
the testimony of Bridgeport’s police chief).
33. Id. at 335.
34. Id. at 339.
35. Id. at 338.
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ion for Stockton, California, which filed for bankruptcy in June 
2012.36 If a city is unable to pay debts as they become due, it is cash 
insolvent. The idea of service delivery insolvency informs the cash 
insolvency analysis by supporting a municipality’s contention that 
its cash deficiency is genuine.37 A municipality is service delivery in-
solvent when it is unable to pay the costs of providing the services 
that are necessary for the community’s health, safety, and welfare.38
In determining Detroit’s eligibility for Chapter 9, the court cata-
logued the city’s various service deficiencies, including a thirty-
minute “priority one” response time for the police department and 
the lack of standard fire equipment,39 before concluding that, of all 
the types of insolvency, the city’s service delivery insolvency was the 
“most strikingly disturbing.”40
C. What Can Chapter 9 Do for a Municipality?
The skeletal nature of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code has led 
some observers to question the efficacy of the municipal bankrupt-
cy process. In a comprehensive analysis of Chapter 9, Michael 
McConnell and Randal Picker posited that Chapter 9 assumes that 
a city will leave bankruptcy with the same governance structures 
with which it entered the process.41 Others have expressed the 
same concern about the lack of governance controls and have sug-
gested modifications to Chapter 9 to give a court more say over 
how a city is managed in bankruptcy.42 A few scholars have posited 
that Chapter 9 is almost useless and have argued that federal law 
should have no role in resolving a municipality’s financial dis-
tress.43
36. In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. at 789–90.
37. Id. at 791.
38. Id. at 789.
39. In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 214 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
40. See id. at 263–64 (comparing the deplorable condition of Detroit’s public services to 
other financial markers that might “more neatly” establish that the city was either generally 
not paying its debts as they became due or unable to pay its debts as they became due).
41. McConnell & Picker, supra note 16, at 469–70 (observing that Chapter 9 does noth-
ing to fundamentally reform a city’s structure).
42. See, e.g., Gillette & Skeel, supra note 30, at 1155 (arguing that bankruptcy court in-
tervention in municipal governance should be an option when the state fails to intervene to 
address the structural difficulties that cause fiscal distress).
43. See Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 
YALE J. ON REG. 351, 353–54 (2010) (arguing that bankruptcy law “is not a sensible solution 
for urban economic crises, and that municipal financial distress should be dealt with in oth-
er manners”); Samir D. Parikh, A New Fulcrum Point for City Survival, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
221, 228 (eschewing Chapter 9 as a key tool for municipal financial recovery and proposing 
that “state law can be the centralized point at which officials exert the necessary amount of 
pressure to gain concessions from unions and bondholders”).
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It is difficult to evaluate the success of Chapter 9. First, the 
number of Chapter 9 filings is minuscule as compared to the num-
ber of individual and corporate bankruptcies. Most of the Chapter 
9 cases filed have not been filed by general-purpose municipalities, 
such as cities, counties, and towns, but rather have been filed by 
special purpose districts.44 Some scholars have proposed metrics by 
which to judge the effectiveness of Chapter 9.45
Spirited debate aside, bankruptcy provides a key tool to strug-
gling municipalities. The function of any bankruptcy proceeding, 
whether filed by an individual, a business entity, or a municipality, 
is to neutralize holdouts.46 Only federal law can give a city the abil-
ity to force creditors to accept less than what they are owed on 
their debts.47 The Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohib-
its state law from allowing this.48
Some have argued that the bar to filing Chapter 9 is set too 
high. General-purpose municipalities do not treat bankruptcy 
lightly, and the deliberations over whether to file unfold publicly. 
As a result, lowering some of the barriers to entry would not cause 
a flood of bankruptcies and would allow cities to receive relief 
sooner, more efficiently, and less expensively.49
There can be a cost to the residents to filing for Chapter 9 and 
that cost is their voice. Although the Bankruptcy Code contains no 
governance controls, federal law yields to, and invites, the partici-
pation of the state in governance matters in the Chapter 9 pro-
cess.50
44. See David A. Skeel, Jr., When Should Bankruptcy be an Option (For People, Places, or 
Things)?, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2217, 2220 (2014) (explaining that most municipal bank-
ruptcy filings involve special-purpose entities such as sewage or water districts).
45. See Vincent S. J. Buccola, The Logic and Limits of Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 86 U. CHI.
L. REV. 817, 833 (2019) (suggesting that Chapter 9 is effective if it preserves spatial econo-
mies by writing down debts likely to discourage local investment).
46. See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 1.2 (4th ed. 2016).
47. See Laura Napoli Coordes, Restructuring Municipal Bankruptcy, 2016 UTAH L. REV.
307, 343 (explaining that Chapter 9 is designed to “embody bankruptcy’s ability to carry out 
key functions, such as contract modification, elimination of debt overhang, and overcoming 
the holdout creditor”).
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
49. See Laura N. Coordes, Gatekeepers Gone Wrong: Reforming the Chapter 9 Eligibility Rules,
94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1191, 1195–96 (2017) (explaining that the Chapter 9 eligibility re-
quirements require municipalities to wait to file for bankruptcy until long after they have 
begun to experience distress and that they result in costly litigation).
50. The Supreme Court recognized this state-federal cooperation in approving the 
original municipal bankruptcy legislation. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 54 (1938) 
(explaining that by allowing a municipality to file for bankruptcy, a state acts “in aid, and 
not in derogation, of its sovereign powers”).
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D. The State-Federal Bankruptcy Partnership
The Bankruptcy Code codifies the role of the state in the Chap-
ter 9 bankruptcy of its municipalities. Chapter 9 contains strict eli-
gibility requirements and one of those requirements is that the 
state must specifically authorize the municipality to file for bank-
ruptcy.51 This requirement has become more stringent over the 
years in that authorization cannot be assumed from the general 
powers that a state gives to its municipalities.52 Only about one-half 
of the states authorize their municipalities to file for bankruptcy, 
and one state, Georgia, explicitly prohibits it.53
The states that permit municipal bankruptcy vary in how they do 
so. In some states, the permission is unconditional.54 In others, the 
authorization to file is conditional, sometimes on the approval of 
the governor or other public official,55 and sometimes on participa-
tion in a financial oversight program.56
Other provisions of Chapter 9 that recognize the state’s role in a 
municipal bankruptcy include § 903, which places an important 
limit on Chapter 9 by stating that it does not “limit or impair the 
power of a State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a munici-
pality of or in such state in the exercise of the political or govern-
mental powers of such municipality, including expenditures for 
such exercise.”57 In addition to recognizing the power of the state, 
51. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2018).
52. See Moringiello, supra note 8, at 458–61 (detailing the history of the specific author-
ization requirement).
53. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., THE STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL DISTRESS 
9–10 (July 23, 2013), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/
2013/07/23/the-state-role-in-local-government-financial-distress (list of states that authorize 
their municipalities to file for bankruptcy); see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-5 (2019) (Geor-
gia statute prohibiting municipalities from filing a bankruptcy petition); see also Christine 
Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Distress: Municipal Bankruptcy, Essential Municipal Services, and Tax-
payers’ Voice, 24 WIDENER L.J. 43, 51–53 (2015) (distinguishing among types of state authori-
zation to file under Chapter 9).
54. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-81-3 (2020) (allowing municipalities in Alabama to file for 
bankruptcy).
55. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 141.1566 (West 2020) (Michigan statute requir-
ing gubernatorial approval for a municipal bankruptcy filing and allowing the governor to 
appoint a person to act exclusively on behalf of the municipality in the bankruptcy proceed-
ings); 53 PA. STAT. § 11701.261 (LEXIS through 2020 Sess.) (Pennsylvania statute requiring 
a municipality to both meet listed conditions and apply for approval to the Secretary of 
Community and Economic Development before filing for bankruptcy); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-
9-7(b)(3) (2020) (allowing a Rhode Island municipality to file for bankruptcy only if the 
state has appointed a receiver for the municipality and giving the receiver the power to file 
the petition in the city’s name).
56. A Pennsylvania municipality may file for Chapter 9 without first participating in the 
state resolution process for financially distressed municipalities, but if it does, it is placed 
into the state program and the state-appointed coordinator manages the bankruptcy pro-
cess). See 53 PA. STAT. § 11701.262(a), (c) (LEXIS through 2020 Sess.).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2018).
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the Bankruptcy Code limits the court’s powers by prohibiting it 
from interfering with “any of the political or governmental powers 
of the debtor, any of the property or revenues of the debtor, or the 
debtor’s use or enjoyment of any income-producing property.”58
By constitutional necessity, the Bankruptcy Code recognizes an 
important difference between business entity governance and mu-
nicipal governance. In a business entity bankruptcy, the residual 
owners stand to lose not only their voice but also their financial in-
vestment.59 In a municipal bankruptcy, a political official manages 
the proceedings. That political official might be the elected city 
leader or he or she might be an official appointed by the state gov-
ernment. Residents of an insolvent municipality do not lose their 
financial investment in the same way that investors in an insolvent 
business entity lose theirs. Their investment is less tangible in that 
they do not have shares in the entity to sell, but it is more tangible 
in that the municipality is where the residents have established 
their homes. When the residents of an insolvent municipality lose
their voice in the future of the municipality, they lose this invest-
ment.
II. MODELS OF OVERSIGHT
When states impose managerial oversight on municipalities, they 
affect the one type of government to which individuals are likely to 
feel connected. Residents feel connected to their local govern-
ments in a deeper way than they do to their more remote state 
governments. Local governments are the most visible and accessi-
ble type of government to most individuals. The vast majority of 
opportunities for participation in political life exist on the local 
level in terms of both running for office and participating in meet-
ings.60 Local governments also provide most of the services that 
people receive.61 As a result, when a state steps in to manage a mu-
nicipality’s finances, residents view the intervention as a takeover,
whether the elected officials are displaced or not.
Replacing, or appearing to replace, an elected municipal gov-
ernment is a controversial move. On the one hand, such a re-
58. 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2018).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (2018); see also David Gray Carlson & Jack F. Williams, 
The Truth About the New Value Exception to Bankruptcy’s Absolute Priority Rule, 21 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1303, 1303 (2000) (“According to Chapter 11’s celebrated absolute priority rule, no 
junior creditor or equity participant may obtain property under a confirmed plan if a dis-
senting unsecured creditor class has not been paid in full.”).
60. BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 2.
61. Id. at 9.
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placement does not alleviate the root causes of financial distress, 
such as deindustrialization and the accompanying job losses.62 A
law that allows a state to take over the management of a local gov-
ernment assumes that political failure is a cause rather than a 
symptom of municipal financial distress.63 On the other hand, 
many municipal decision makers come to their roles unprepared 
to manage a city’s finances. Although the largest cities in the Unit-
ed States have full-time city councils, the vast majority of American 
cities are governed by part-time councils.64 In smaller cities, city 
council members serve with little or no compensation.65 Moreover, 
in all cities, elected officials are often focused on reelection and 
thus may lack the political will to make the necessary financial 
choices.66 In some cases the elected city government engaged in 
opaque and complex financial transactions that may have been in-
visible or incomprehensible to the average resident.67 Those trans-
actions may have been incomprehensible to municipal officials as 
well; as one study has shown, well less than half of elected state and 
local government officials report any expertise in public finance.68
As a result, some states intervene to provide financial oversight 
over their distressed cities.
There are several models for municipal financial oversight, and 
the financial crises that led to three municipal bankruptcy filings—
those of Central Falls, Rhode Island; Detroit, Michigan; and Har-
risburg, Pennsylvania—shaped three different models. The three 
states also illustrate the different types of oversight, with Michi-
gan’s and Rhode Island’s highest level of oversight resulting in the 
replacement of elected officials and Pennsylvania’s leaving elected 
officials in place.
62. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Democratic Dissolution: Radical Experimentation in State 
Takeovers of Local Governments, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 577, 582 (2012) (criticizing the view 
that “it is only local government management that stands in the way of solvency”).
63. See Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1199 
(2018) (observing that “[d]eindustrialization, white flight, disinvestment, and concentrated 
poverty are not caused by mismanagement, though they can be exacerbated by it”).
64. See Kellen Zale, Part-Time Government, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 987, 1016 (2019).
65. See Kellen Zale, Compensating City Councils, 70 STAN. L. REV. 839, 851 (2018).
66. See Marti Kopacz et al., Democracy in Peril: What to Do When Elected Officials Haven’t,
Won’t, or Can’t, 37 MUN. FIN. J., Winter 2017, at 21, 26 (remarks of Angel Taveras, former 
mayor of Providence, Rhode Island).
67. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Dictatorships for Democracy: Takeovers of Financially Failed 
Cities, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1402 (2014) (“[Municipal] fiscal distress is often accompa-
nied by opaque budgeting tactics.”); see also David Unkovic, Municipal Distress: Reflections of a
Receiver, 24 WIDENER L.J. 9, 12–14 (2015) (explaining the complex financial instruments 
marketed to municipalities).
68. See Darien Shanske, The (Now Urgent) Case for State-Level Monitoring of Local Govern-
ment Finances: Protecting Localities from Trump’s “Potemkin Village of Nothing,” 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 773, 775 (2017) (citing a study that reports that only thirty-eight percent of 
such officials consider themselves “very knowledgeable” about public finance).
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Rhode Island’s model provides for increasing levels of oversight 
that respond to the needs of each financially distressed municipali-
ty. The state revised its municipal financial oversight regime and 
granted more powers to state-appointed overseers in response to 
the fiscal crisis in Central Falls. Central Falls ultimately filed for 
bankruptcy under the revised law in 2011.69
The first step in the Rhode Island model is the appointment of a 
fiscal overseer, either at the request of the municipal governing 
body or by the state director of revenue in the event that certain 
indicia of financial distress are present.70 The fiscal overseer has an 
advisory role and provides assistance to the municipality in all mat-
ters related to its financial affairs.71 If the fiscal overseer finds that 
the municipality either will not be able to present a balanced 
budget or faces a fiscal crisis that poses an imminent danger to its 
citizens, the state can appoint a budget commission.72 The budget 
commission’s role is more supervisory than advisory, and it has the 
authority to formulate and execute the municipality’s annual 
budget and review and approve or disapprove all of the municipal-
ity’s contracts for goods and services.73 The last step is the ap-
pointment of a receiver for the municipality,74 which the state can 
do if either the budget commission concludes that it cannot re-
store fiscal stability to the municipality75 or if the director of reve-
nue determines that the municipality is facing a fiscal emergency 
of such a nature that circumstances do not allow for the appoint-
ment of a fiscal overseer or budget commission. The receiver can 
exercise the power of any elected municipal official and has the 
power to file a Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition for the municipali-
ty.76
As is the case in Rhode Island, Michigan’s municipal financial 
oversight law allows the state to replace the elected municipal gov-
ernment. Michigan strengthened its oversight law when both the 
City of Detroit and the Detroit Public Schools were facing severe 
financial crises.77 In Michigan, the state financial authority can 
69. See Anderson, supra note 62, at 595–97 (describing the history of Rhode Island’s
municipal financial oversight statute).
70. 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-3 (2020).
71. Cf. 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-3(d) (2020) (setting forth the responsibilities of the 
fiscal overseer).
72. 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-5 (2020).
73. See 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-6(d) (2020) (setting forth the powers of a budget 
commission).
74. 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-8 (2020).
75. 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-7 (2020).
76. 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-7(b) (2020).
77. See Anderson, supra note 62, at 586–87 (describing the history of Michigan’s munic-
ipal financial oversight statute).
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conduct a review to determine whether a local government is suf-
fering from financial stress if the local government requests such a 
review or if one of a number of triggering financial events, such as 
the failure to pay salaries or retirement benefits, occurs.78 If the 
Governor determines that the local government is suffering from a 
financial emergency, the Governor may appoint an emergency 
manager to “act for and in the place and stead of the governing 
body and the office of the chief administrative officer of the local 
government.”79 Michigan law gives the emergency manager the 
power to issue binding orders to the local elected and appointed 
officials, and if such an official does not comply with the emergen-
cy manager’s orders, that person can be locked out of the local 
government offices and facilities, including e-mail and information 
systems.80
Pennsylvania’s model is different from the Rhode Island and 
Michigan models. Although Harrisburg, the state capital, filed for 
bankruptcy, its case was dismissed six weeks later because the city 
was not authorized by the state to file.81 The city worked to resolve 
its financial distress under the state Municipalities Financial Re-
covery Act, more commonly known as Act 47. Pennsylvania enacted
Act 47 in 1987 in response to the financial distress faced by Penn-
sylvania municipalities in the wake of the steel industry’s collapse.82
By the time that Harrisburg filed for bankruptcy in 2011, Act 47 
was in need of a reassessment. Harrisburg’s financial collapse 
spurred the legislature to make several changes to the act with the 
goal of making it more effective.
As originally designed in the 1980s, Act 47’s goal is to enable a 
city to help itself emerge from financial distress. To do so, the law 
leaves the principal responsibility for a municipality’s financial af-
fairs to its locally elected officials.83 Pennsylvania’s legislature did 
not prohibit an outright takeover of city government out of pure 
benevolence; the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits a special 
commission from assuming the functions of city government.84 Be-
fore 2011, however, Act 47 enabled the state to provide technical 
expertise, but not financial supervision, to a distressed local gov-
78. MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 141.1544(1) (2012).
79. MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 141.1549 (2012).
80. MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 141.1550 (2012).
81. In re City of Harrisburg, 465 B.R. 744, 765 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011).
82. See LOCAL GOV’T COMM’N, REPORT ON MUNICIPAL FISCAL DISTRESS: BACKGROUND 
AND LEGISLATIVE REMEDY, at 1 (Pa. 1987); see also Michelle Wilde Anderson, Who Needs Local 
Government Anyway? Dissolution in Pennsylvania’s Distressed Cities, 24 WIDENER L.J. 149, 159–161 
(2015) (describing the conditions that led Pennsylvania to develop Act 47).
83. LOCAL GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 82, at i.
84. PA. CONST. art. III, § 31.
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ernment. When a city entered the Act 47 program, the state ap-
pointed an Act 47 coordinator for the city, but that coordinator’s
only duties were (and are)85 to assist the city government in devel-
oping a financial recovery plan. In order for the plan to go into ef-
fect, the governing body of the municipality must approve it.86 The 
law provided an incentive to municipalities to approve the plan; a 
municipality that did not approve a plan stood to lose funding 
from the state for which it would otherwise be eligible.87 In Harris-
burg’s case, that proved to be a weak incentive.
As distasteful as financial supervision may seem to residents, 
Harrisburg’s financial crisis illustrates why it is sometimes neces-
sary. In July 2011, Harrisburg did something that no Act 47 munic-
ipality had ever done before—it rejected the coordinator’s recov-
ery plan.88 Harrisburg’s city government was famously 
dysfunctional at the time, with a majority of members on the city 
council intent on filing for bankruptcy regardless of what the 
mayor or the experts that it had hired to advise the city on its fi-
nancial problems thought.89 The squabbles at city hall and the 
council’s rejection of the Act 47 plan led the legislature to do two 
things: prohibit Harrisburg from filing for bankruptcy90 and revise 
Act 47. The revision provided for the appointment of a receiver for 
a municipality that refused to adopt an Act 47 plan proposed by its 
coordinator.91
By 2011, Act 47 was due for an overhaul. In the wake of Harris-
burg’s financial woes, the legislature revised the act three times.92
One problem with Act 47 is that few municipalities succeeded in 
exiting the program. That remains a problem, with several cities 
85. See 53 PA. STAT. § 11701.221(d) (LEXIS through 2020 Sess.).
86. 53 PA. STAT. § 11701.245 (LEXISthrough 2020 Sess.).
87. LOCAL GOV’T COMM’N, 2013 TASK FORCE REPORT ON ACT 47 OF 1987
MUNICIPALITIES FINANCIAL RECOVERY ACT, at 14 (Pa. 2013).
88. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Specific Authorization to File Under Chapter 9: Lessons from 
Harrisburg, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 237, 242 (2012) (detailing the contentious relationship be-
tween Harrisburg’s mayor and the city council that led to the rejection of the Act 47 plan).
89. See id. (discussing the recommendations of Cravath, Swaine & Moore).
90. 72 PA. STAT. § 1601-D.1 (2012) (prohibiting distressed cities from filing for bank-
ruptcy until November 30, 2012). After the City of Harrisburg filed for bankruptcy notwith-
standing the statute, it unsuccessfully argued in the bankruptcy court that the statute was 
special legislation prohibited by the Pennsylvania Constitution. The court dismissed the 
bankruptcy case on the grounds that the filing was not authorized. See In re City of Harris-
burg, 465 B.R. 744 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011).
91. 53 PA. STAT. § 11701.702 (LEXIS through 2020 Sess.).
92. See LOCAL GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 87, at 16–17 (describing the 2011 and 2012 
amendments); William C. Rhodes & Kimberly D. Magnini, Act 47: Pennsylvania Says Enough is 
Enough. Or is It?, BALLARD SPAHR (Oct. 31, 2014), https://www.ballardspahr.com
/alertspublications/legalalerts/2014-10-31-act-47-pennsylvania-says-enough-is-enough-or-is-it 
(explaining the 2014 amendments).
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marking their third decade in the program93 despite a new provi-
sion that attempts to limit a municipality’s stay in the Act 47 pro-
gram to five years.94 In addition, the state’s Local Government 
Commission concluded that Act 47 did not adequately respond to 
situations where political dysfunction prevented the adoption and 
implementation of a recovery plan.95 To address that flaw, the act 
now permits the Governor to appoint a receiver for a municipality 
that has failed to adopt its Act 47 coordinator’s plan.96 The receiver 
has the power to require the municipal government to implement 
the recovery plan and dispose of assets if necessary, but the munic-
ipal government remains in place.97 As a result, the receiver must 
work with elected officials.
Rhode Island, Michigan, and Pennsylvania provide just three ex-
amples of municipal financial intervention. Regardless of how 
oversight is structured, residents are likely to view the supervision 
as a takeover of city government.98 The appointment of a receiver 
for the City of Harrisburg was widely reported as a state takeover of 
the city despite the fact that the mayor remained in power.99 How 
supervision is implemented is key to preserving the voting rights 
and voice of residents.
III. MUNICIPAL PROPERTY AND RESIDENT VOICE
A key challenge in a municipal bankruptcy and in municipal fi-
nancial crises handled outside of Chapter 9 involves the disposition 
of municipal property. This challenge erupted into the interna-
tional limelight in Detroit’s bankruptcy when questions arose as to 
whether the renowned collection of the Detroit Institute of Art was 
93. The cities of Scranton, Chester, and Johnstown, as well as several smaller Pennsyl-
vania municipalities have been in the Act 47 program for more than 20 years. See PA. DEP’T
OF CMTY. & ECON. DEV., Act 47 Financial Distress, https://dced.pa.gov/local-government/act-
47-financial-distress (last visited May 30, 2020).
94. 53 PA. STAT. § 11701.254 (LEXIS through 2020 Sess.).
95. LOCAL GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 87, at 26.
96. 53 PA. STAT. §§ 11701.602, 11701.702 (LEXIS through 2020 Sess.).
97. 53 PA. STAT. §§ 11701.706, 11701. 708 (LEXIS through 2020 Sess.).
98. See Gillette, supra note 67, at 1379 (explaining that the appointment of an entity 
charged with financial intervention is likely to generate hostility among municipal residents 
regardless of whether the state appointed entity has the authority to displace city officials).
99. See, e.g., Marc Levy, Corbett Taps Retired General to Steer Pa. Capital, THE TRIBUNE-
DEMOCRAT (May 11, 2012), https://www.tribdem.com/news/local_news/corbett-taps-
retired-general-to-steer-pa-capital/article_c3b2f283-942a-54d6-9712-74aa48c2bf0c.html (de-
scribing the appointment of a receiver for Harrisburg as “an unprecedented takeover of one 
of [Pennsylvania’s] cities.”); see also Eric Veronikis, Bankruptcy Hearing Affects More Than 
Harrisburg, Finance Experts Say, PENNLIVE (Nov. 23, 2011), https://www.pennlive.com
/midstate/2011/11/bankruptcy_hearing_affects_mor.html (“Debt-hobbled Harrisburg’s
options might soon be whittled down to one: a state takeover.”).
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up for grabs by creditors.100 If the collection had been owned by an 
individual or a business entity in bankruptcy, there would have 
been no question that the creditors were entitled to the value of 
the collection in bankruptcy.101 Municipal bankruptcy is different 
because municipalities hold their property in public trust for their 
residents.
The rule that a municipality holds property in trust for its resi-
dents has its roots in the 1880 Supreme Court opinion in Meriweth-
er v. Garrett.102 The Meriwether opinion lays out clearly the web of re-
lationships with respect to municipal property. The case arose 
from a municipal financial crisis involving Memphis, Tennessee. In 
response to the crisis, the state repealed the city’s charter and ap-
pointed a receiver to take control of the city’s property and collect 
taxes due to the city.103 A group of the city’s creditors then sued in 
state court to force the receiver to apply the city’s property to the 
debts owed to them, and the state court granted the request.104 In 
rejecting the rulings of the lower courts, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that although the residents of the city had no vested 
right in the city charter, they were the beneficiaries of a trust im-
posed on property held by the city for public use, and therefore 
the creditors were not entitled to force the sale of such property.105
In recognizing a trust structure, the Court implied that a munici-
pality is akin to the trustee of a private trust in that it has “no pro-
prietary rights distinct from the trust for the public.”106 As a result, 
even when a state takes over a city, it is holding the city property 
for the residents, not for the creditors.
Although a municipality cannot lose property by forced sale, the 
municipal government can decide to sell property for the benefit 
of the municipality’s creditors. Here is where municipal bankrupt-
cy or non-bankruptcy insolvency might cause a dispossession as we 
commonly think of it. Whether a city files for bankruptcy or not, a 
city in distress is likely to sell property to alleviate its debt burden. 
In order to emerge from its distress, a city needs to balance its 
budget, and that can be done only by increasing revenue and re-
ducing expenses. Yet the obvious method of increasing revenue, 
raising taxes, may be futile. Another method is selling property. 
100. See generally Brian L. Frye, Art & the “Public Trust” in Municipal Bankruptcy, 93 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 629 (2016) (describing the history of the Detroit Institute of Art and 
describing the dispute over the art in the bankruptcy case).
101. See supra notes 20–22 and accompanying text.
102. 102 U.S. 472 (1880).
103. Id. at 503–05.
104. Id. at 510.
105. Id. at 511–13.
106. Id. at 513.
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Some have argued that a municipality may be required to sell 
property in order to prove to a court that its Chapter 9 plan of ad-
justment meets all requirements for plan confirmation.107 In recent 
years, cities have monetized assets such as parking systems, ice are-
nas, airports, and waterworks.108 Whether or not a municipality sold 
assets to alleviate budget problems might be a consideration in de-
termining whether a municipality is even eligible to file for Chap-
ter 9.109
In the case of an ordinary trust, a trustee holds property as a fi-
duciary for the beneficiaries of that trust. As a result, the trustee 
must “administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiar-
ies.”110 Likewise, corporate directors are bound to act in the best 
interests of the corporation that they serve.111 Few have explored 
how that trust concept translates to the municipal environment 
when a public official disposes of property held in the public trust. 
Courts impose fiduciary duties on elected officials, requiring them 
to act for the good of others rather than their own good.112 This fi-
duciary duty runs to the public in general because a public official 
acts as a “trustee for the citizens and the state . . . .”113 Yet when the 
City of Chicago transferred seventy-five years of revenue from its 
parking system in a transaction described as “hasty [and] unin-
formed,” neither the litigants nor the court raised any issue of fi-
duciary duties.114 Two scholars have made a compelling argument 
that the legal history of cities supports the application of a corpo-
rate-style duty of care to municipal officials when they transact in 
property held in the public trust.115 Imposing such a duty would al-
107. See B. Summer Chandler & Mark S. Kaufman, Maybe Taxes Aren’t So Certain: What is 
Fair and Equitable in a Chapter 9 Plan, 32 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12, 12–13 (2013).
108. Max Schanzenbach & Nadav Shoked, Reclaiming Fiduciary Law for the City, 70 STAN.
L. REV. 565, 567–72 (2018).
109. See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 191, 264 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (rejecting ob-
jecting creditors’ argument that the city should have monetized assets to alleviate its cash 
flow insolvency because “a one-time infusion of cash, whether from an asset sale or a borrow-
ing, only delays the inevitable failure”); In re City of Stockton, 493 B.R. 772, 790 (Bankr. E.D. 
Cal. 2013) (acknowledging, in analyzing the city’s budget insolvency, that “[f]ew fixed assets 
are available to be sold or otherwise monetized”).
110. WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES INCLUDING 
TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS § 14.1 (5th ed. 2017).
111. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS LAW § 10.2 (4th ed. 
2016).
112. Vincent R. Johnson, The Fiduciary Obligations of Public Officials, 9 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 298, 315 (2019); see also Ethan J. Leib et al., Translating Fiduciary 
Principles into Public Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 91, 93–96 (2013) (describing the difficulties 
inherent in translating private fiduciary concepts to the duties of elected officials).
113. See Johnson, supra note 112, at 317–18.
114. See Schanzenbach & Shoked, supra note 108, at 567–69 (describing the Chicago 
parking system deal and the lack of fiduciary analysis applied to it).
115. See id. at 573–74.
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low courts to review the city’s decision-making process in monetiz-
ing assets held in the public trust.116
A city government always has the right to dispose of property 
held in the public trust. When a city becomes unable to pay its 
debts, however, the leadership of the municipal government can 
be replaced by unelected officials. This is not a function of bank-
ruptcy law, rather, it is a function of state law. As noted above, it is 
unclear what the duties of elected officials are to the public when 
they monetize public property. It is even less clear what the duties 
of appointed receivers and emergency managers are.117 In replac-
ing city government officials, a state dispossesses citizens of their 
voice in choosing the people who determine the future of the 
property held for them in the public trust.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
There are several legal changes that can preserve the voices of 
city residents in resolving municipal financial distress. They range 
from those that are in state hands to those that can only be imple-
mented by amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.
A. Proactive Approach to Municipal Finance
As the discussion above illustrates, states tend to be reactive in 
their approaches to managing municipal financial distress. When 
bankruptcy appears to be a realistic threat, states ratchet up their 
supervision, often in ways that deprive the distressed municipality’s
residents of a voice in what happens to municipal property. Tech-
nical assistance in the form of early intervention in financial dis-
tress is useful for several reasons. Most obviously, it can head off a 
potential bankruptcy filing. It also permits the municipality to work 
in a cooperative and positive environment with state appointed 
players in furtherance of a common goal.118
Even better than early intervention is oversight over municipal 
borrowing at all stages. North Carolina has an effective system for 
116. See id. at 574.
117. For example, Pennsylvania’s Act 47 is silent as to what a receiver must consider be-
fore monetizing public trust assets. See e.g., 53 PA. STAT. § 11701.706 (LEXIS through 2020 
Sess.) (setting forth the powers and duties of an appointed receiver).
118. LOCAL GOV’T COMM’N, 2013 TASK FORCE REPORT ON ACT 47 OF 1987
MUNICIPALITIES FINANCIAL RECOVERY ACT, at 23–24 (Pa. 2013) (advocating for an “effective 
and timely early warning system . . . to trigger the offer of technical assistance and training 
to pre-distressed municipalities); see also 53 PA. STAT. §§ 11701.101-A–11701.108-A (LEXIS 
through 2020 Sess.) (codifying an early intervention program in Pennsylvania).
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supervising municipal borrowing.119 North Carolina requires the 
approval of its Local Government Commission for all municipal 
borrowings. This approach, adopted in the 1930s after numerous 
bond defaults in the state, has largely kept its municipalities out of 
financial distress. In North Carolina, a municipal official can be 
removed from office for not complying with the law governing ap-
provals of municipal borrowing.120 Proponents of North Carolina’s
approach credit the Local Government Commission with giving lo-
cal governments “the flexibility to make decisions to positively af-
fect their communities.”121
B. Reject Takeover for Cooperative Oversight
The residents of a municipality are the ones who are going to 
have to live with the long-term consequences of any recovery plan. 
Their voice in the process should therefore be preserved. Although 
as explained above, any act of state oversight is often considered to 
be a takeover, there are ways to soften that perception.
In implementing cooperative oversight, states should consider 
the prerequisites for serving in an oversight position. In Pennsylva-
nia, the person appointed as receiver must have experience in 
business, state, or local budgetary matters and must also have been 
a resident of Pennsylvania for at least a year prior to appoint-
ment.122 In Michigan, the Emergency Manager must likewise have 
financial expertise, but the appointee “may, but need not, be a res-
ident of the local government” for which the Emergency Manager 
is appointed.123 For example, Kevyn Orr, the Emergency Manager 
appointed for Detroit, came to the job from Washington, D.C.124
C. Permit Municipalities to File for Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy is an important implement in the financial recovery 
toolbox. As explained above, a municipality can file for Chapter 9 
119. See generally Adam C. Parker, Positive Liberty in Public Finance: State Oversight of Local-
Government Debt and the North Carolina Model, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 107, 160 (“North Caroli-
na’s experience has shown that such a system keeps local-government interest rates low and 
helps avert fiscal crises.”) (2015).
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 159-182 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess.).
121. Parker, supra note 119.
122. 53 PA. STAT. § 11701.705(b) (LEXIS, through 2020 Sess.).
123. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 141.1549(3) (West 2020).
124. Chad Livengood, In Detroit and Flint, Two Tales of Emergency Management, CRAIN’S
DETROIT BUS. (Apr. 29, 2018), https://www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20180429/blog026
/659321/in-detroit-and-flint-two-tales-of-emergency-management.
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only if its state specifically permits such a filing.125 Prohibiting a 
municipality from filing for bankruptcy deprives a municipality of a 
key tool in resolving its financial distress. Even if a municipality 
does not ultimately file for bankruptcy, the threat to do so is a po-
tent tool in creditor negotiations. For example, the Receiver for 
Harrisburg made clear that a key part of his strategy for negotiat-
ing with creditors was to prepare to file for bankruptcy.126 Com-
bined with the cooperative oversight suggested above, allowing 
municipalities the use of the full municipal financial recovery 
toolkit gives residents important control over their municipality’s
destiny.
D. On the Federal Level: Formalize Service Delivery Insolvency
Many people would be surprised to learn that neither a business 
entity nor an individual must be insolvent before filing for bank-
ruptcy. As discussed above, however, that is not the case for a mu-
nicipality. This requirement has prevented some municipalities 
from seeking bankruptcy protection.127 Although the Bankruptcy 
Code defines insolvency for a municipality as the inability to pay 
debts as they come due,128 it is not always clear how dire a munici-
pality’s situation must be in order to file.
The fact that a city must be out of money to take advantage of 
bankruptcy runs counter to the idea that a city exists to provide 
public services to its residents. As discussed above, the courts in 
several recent high-profile municipal bankruptcy cases, including 
that of Detroit, have recognized the concept of service delivery in-
solvency.129 A city is insolvent in that sense when it can no longer 
effectively provide the necessary public services. Combining service 
delivery insolvency with primary decision-making by elected offi-
cials would allow residents to have some voice in their city’s destiny 
before public services fall below an acceptable level.130
125. See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text.
126. Donald Gilliland, Why Not Bankruptcy for Harrisburg’s Debt? A Closer Look at the Receiv-
er’s Strategy, PENNLIVE (July 24, 2013), https://www.pennlive.com/midstate/2013/07/why_
not_bankruptcy_for_harrisb.html.
127. See Coordes, supra note 49, at 1224–25 (explaining that the insolvency requirement 
deprives struggling cities of needed relief).
128. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(C) (2018).
129. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text.
130. See Chung, supra note 53, at 69 (opining that Judge Rhodes’ consideration of ser-
vice delivery insolvency in deciding that Detroit was eligible for Chapter 9 “opened the door 
to consideration of taxpayer interests at the eligibility stage”).
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CONCLUSION
At the time of this writing, the municipal bankruptcy scene is 
quiet with no new filings by cities, counties, or towns. The munici-
pal bankruptcy cases in the past ten years involving Detroit, Stock-
ton, and Central Falls, and the insolvency case of Harrisburg, pro-
vide valuable lessons if lawmakers reassess their approaches to mu-
municipal insolvency. While state oversight of municipal finances 
can be effective, it should be effectuated in such a way as to pre-
serve resident voice as much as possible so that residents are not 
dispossessed of their voice, nor of property held in trust for them.
